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Abstract 
In the first part of this article, I describe a variety of cases that I have been involved with 
that led to my becoming an expert witness.  These cases range from questions about childrenǯs memory for being raped, to remembering an ear-witnessed murder, to 
preventing future false memories.  In the second part of this article, I reflect on some of 
the remarkable feats of remembering that complainants exhibit in court, ones that 
contradict much of what the scientific study of memory has shown to be true.  Along the 
way, I argue that until this scientific knowledge becomes part of a ǲculture of memoryǳ 
familiar to triers of fact (judges, jurors), police, and laypeople, memory experts will 
continue to be an inexorable part of the legal process when memory serves as the main 
or only evidence.  
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Memory Lessons from the Courtroom: Reflections on being a Memory Expert on the 
Witness Stand 
I. Experiences of an Accidental Memory Expert Witness 
By way of background, let me start by noting that I have been providing written, oral, 
and practical advice on legal matters where memory has served as the main or only 
evidence for over 20 years now in cases in Canada, the United States, and the United 
Kingdom.  My introduction to this world of ǲapplied memoryǳ came when I was a professor at Memorial University in St. Johnǯs Newfoundland in Canada.  In the early 
1990s, I was called by the prosecution to testify in a case involving a girl who had 
brought a series of rape charges against her primary school teacher.  Quite remarkable, I 
was asked whether a person who was 12 to 13 years old could remember such an event 
with any degree of accuracy.  More specifically, the prosecution (and the court) 
wondered what sorts of details someone who was being raped (and hence under stress) 
should remember and which ones would they forget?  While on the stand and being 
examined in chief, a rather lengthy discussion took place concerning key factors in 
memory for such traumatic events.  These included the role of peripheral and central 
details in long-term remembering, the impact of stress on memory, and the importance of dissociative processes, ones that could ostensibly play a key part in the ǲrepressionǳ 
of such experiences.  Of course, all of these variables were commonly discussed in cases 
such as these during the 1990s and they were all critical variables embedded in the 
memory research literature of the time.  
All of this was going as anticipated.  But following my examination in chief, the 
lawyer for the defence began a cross examination that was entirely unexpected.  That is, 
rather than wanting to know about memory, he decided to attack what he believed to be 
the basis of my opinion.  In particular, he asked a number of very pointed (and well 
rehearsed) questions about the kinds of mathematical (i.e., Markov) models I used in my 
research.  Being a graduate in mathematics himself prior to becoming a lawyer, this 
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questioner believed that he could attack my credibility as a memory expert by trying to 
dazzle the jurors with his knowledge of mathematics and attempting to show that I was 
not as smart as he was when it came to Markov modeling.  Such a strategy foundered, 
not only inasmuch as he did not really seem to know much about his chosen topic, 
Markov models, but after approximately 45 minutes of such questioning, the judge 
turned to the him and remarked, ǲwhat does this have to do with the matter before the bench?ǳ  This not only served to wake up the jury, but also ended the defenceǯs rather 
bizarre, and as it turned out extremely ineffective, cross-examination.  Needless to say, 
this introduction to the role of memory expert in the courtroom left me rather 
perplexed.  Indeed, I left wondering whether such an adventure should be entertained 
again in the future. 
Of course, I did return to the witness stand and have served as a memory expert 
in hundreds cases requiring a wide range of circumstances.  Over the past couple of 
decades in my role as a memory expert, I have not only testified in numerous trials, but 
also have assisted authorities (i.e., the police) before they interviewed traumatized 
children to insure as unbiased an interview as possible.  In fact, I have devoted 
considerable time and effort in training frontline workers (e.g., police, social workers) 
how to conduct interviews that elicit as much factual information as possible while at 
the same time trying to minimize the amount of incorrect or false information.  
Fortunately, many of these procedures are now well known and have been formalized in 
the writings of a number of prominent researchers, including the important work by 
Michael Lamb and his collaborators (e.g., see Lamb et al., 2009).  In my experience, a 
particularly poignant case concerned two young children (4 and 6 years old at the time), 
one who had ear-witnessed and the other who may have also eyewitnessed their motherǯs murder.  This was a particularly difficult case – even getting to the stage where 
rapport was established took a considerable amount of time.  Indeed, the judicial need for ǲuntaintedǳ evidence provided stark contrast to the childrenǯs mental health needs 
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during this traumatic time.  Eventually, though, both children not only received the care 
and help they needed, but were able to provide sufficiently detailed accounts of this 
horrific event that an arrest was made and a conviction obtained. 
In a number of other cases, my role has been to provide evidence about what 
children at different ages can and cannot remember about events they witnessed over 
significant delays or very lengthy retention intervals.  These intervals can extend to one 
or more years depending on delays experienced in getting the case to trial.  Such 
questions are important not only because of the effects that time itself can have on 
memory generally, but more specifically the effects that the nature and number of 
intervening events occurring during the delay can have on memory (also see Alexander 
et al., 2005).  
Of course, these opinions focused not only on memory accuracy, but also on the 
potential influence of suggestibility from authority figures (e.g., questioning by the 
police, social workers, prosecutors), something that could fill an entire book.  Indeed, 
there were a number of very similar cases during the late 1990s in which children 
(always girls) were coached (at school or by social service case workers) through some 
very specific workbooks to ǲget out their anger toward their father.ǳ  Frequently, these 
workbooks started off in a very innocuous manner (drawings of father and daughter 
playing together) but ended with drawings of the child trying to hurt or kill their father 
(e.g., by stabbing their father with knives).  These drawings included very detailed and 
gory depictions of the child and her father, ones that often included blood being spilled, 
disembodied limbs, and even decapitation.  Curiously, it turned out that these cases 
foundered in court, not only due to the lack of any evidence but also because the 
children themselves (as well as their mothers) testified that the father had not done 
anything untoward to their children.  Remarkably, many of these children would later 
testify that they had simply drawn these pictures to appease the urgings of the social 
worker in charge of the case. 
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It is not just suggestions that can play a role in what may bring a child to court, 
but even more egregious are those cases in which children are led to believe that 
specific events have occurred when in fact they have not (i.e., false memories for entire 
events).  For me, when it comes to discussing suggested and false memories in children, 
perhaps the most interesting case came from a divorce trial in Family Court.  In this case, the fatherǯs attorney wanted an opinion not about false memories that could possibly be 
affecting the present case but about future false memories!  Here, the mother, in her bid 
to get sole custody of her children, led the children to believe, and to subsequently make 
claims, that the father had physically and sexually abused them.  Following a police investigation that exonerated the father and the motherǯs subsequent admission that the 
things she had her children say about the father were fabrications, the fatherǯs attorney 
wanted advice on how to prevent these children from coming to believe that these abuse 
claims were true at some point in the future.  Of course, we know a considerable amount 
about how false memories come about, but we know very little about how to prevent 
them in the future.  Although we can make recommendations that the facts of what 
happened be refreshed from time to time, or at the very least, be made accessible when 
doubts arise as to the veracity of these earlier allegations, this case does provide 
considerable fodder for a different slant on the study of false memories. 
The study of future false memories aside, the one thing about examining the ǲmemoryǳ content of cases and subsequently testifying in court about them is that one 
learns a considerable amount about what we do and do not know about memory.  For 
example, we learn about naïve beliefs concerning memory that are held by triers of fact 
(e.g., judges, jurors), something that can be used to justify the presence of a memory 
expert in any trial involving memory-based evidence.  Indeed, as experts we are often 
confronted with lawyers (and judges) who believe that memory experts provide little 
information of value beyond that which a layperson does not already know about 
memory from their own ǲlifeǳ experiences.  Of course, research has clearly shown that 
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memory experts have considerable information that triers of fact are unaware of, 
information that is invaluable in evaluating the legitimacy of memory as evidence in 
most, if not all, cases (e.g., Benton, Ross, Bradshaw, Thomas, & Bradshaw, 2006; 
Magnussen, Melinder, Stridbeck, & Raja, 2010; Simons & Chabris, 2011). 
Before turning to an examination of some of these naïve beliefs, particularly 
ones having to do with childhood memories (see the next section), there are two other 
key points that need to be articulated.  First, as illustrated in the cases described so far 
in this article, there may be questions that we are asked to address for which there is no 
answer.  Indeed, it is important to acknowledge that some of the questions we confront 
as expert witnesses are actually valuable inasmuch as they provide fodder for new 
avenues of research.   From a research perspective, when we are asked questions about 
memory for which there may not be a particularly solid scientific base from which to 
draw an answer, we should view this as an opportunity to design relevant experiments.  
Here, a good case in point is the question about the prevention of future false memories.  
Although one can marshal a reasonable answer based on what we know about memory 
rehearsal and the factors that affect memory accuracy over time, it does provide 
research food for thought.  
Second, although we often attend trials and provide expert evidence, perhaps 
the most effective point at which to dispense expertise is before charges have been laid 
(i.e., at the level of the police).   This is simply because such advice can often prevent 
miscarriages of justice before they have a chance to occur.  However, more often than 
not, many of the cases we deal with involve charges that have already been laid, 
something that then requires the expert to testify in court about such matters.  This 
need to become involved earlier in the judicial process is best illustrated in the cases 
that are presented in the next section. 
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II. Cases Where Memory Matters Most  
Although almost all court cases involve memory evidence of some sort or 
another, nowhere does it matter more than when the only evidence is memory.  These 
cases are often about historic childhood sexual abuse where accusations involve crimes 
alleged to have happened in the very distant past.  Often these allegations are about 
crimes that involve only two witnesses – the victim and the perpetrator.  In court, the 
memories of the victim and the perpetrator will obviously differ (otherwise there would 
be no trial) and it is up to the triers of fact to determine which memory is more reliable – that is, which one is most likely true. 
I have been involved in many such cases and have testified both for the 
prosecution and the defence.  More often than not, when it comes to historic sexual 
abuse cases, it is the defence that relies on advice from a memory expert with the 
prosecution calling their expert witness primarily in rebuttal.  As well, in most of these 
cases, the alleged abuse is said to have occurred at least 10 to 40 years earlier.  Often the 
events in question went unnoticed by significant others (e.g., parents, teachers, friends) 
and went unreported at the time.  It is because the hallmark of these cases is adult recall 
of early childhood events that memory expertise is sorely needed. 
Over the years, I have evaluated hundreds of complainantsǯ ȋboth male and 
female) statements concerning historic childhood abuse and have written numerous 
case reports concerning the reliability of memory for witnessed events that have 
occurred decades earlier.  Starting with the Mt. Cashel trials of child sexual abuse by Christian Brothers in St. Johnǯs Newfoundland during the 1990s, a series of trials that generally ended in convictions of the priests who ran the boysǯ orphanage, I have 
reviewed statements by adults concerning their memories for events that transpired 
many decades earlier.  Somewhat ironically, one of the many complainants in these 
cases observed that the main problem with memory researchers was that they were not 
studying the right thing – the relevant question, he opined, was not whether one could 
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or could not remember the horrific abuse that they had suffered, as he said it was still all 
too real.  Rather, what we should be studying was how we could help victims of abuse 
forget what had happened. 
Despite this admonition, I, like many memory researchers, continued to study 
factors that contribute to accurate memory for the past as well as those variables that 
lead to inaccuracies or create false memories.  Although some researchers have 
examined the effects of propranolol and other interventions on the erasure of traumatic 
memories (e.g., Pitman et al., 2002), something I am certain our admonisher would 
approve of, most research has focused on what ǲrealǳ memories of the distant past ǲlookǳ like in contrast to those recollections that are blatantly false.  Despite continued 
research on this agenda, we still do not have a litmus test that discriminates true from 
false memories (Bernstein & Loftus, 2009).  However, what we do see are some 
transcripts that appear to detail some remarkable recollections of events that happened 
some 10 to 40 or more years ago, ones that defy what we have discovered about how 
memory operates (also see Howe, 2012).  In the remainder of this section, I provide 
some examples of these amazing feats of memory and illustrate how they violate the 
very memory laws we have uncovered through our rigorous research efforts. 
 To begin, consider the fact that most cases of early memory involve descriptions 
of events from the distant past, events that may not have been stressful or traumatic at 
the time.  For example, it is not atypical for complainants to describe touching events 
that occurred early in what they believe to be an escalating pattern of abuse.  These 
events are said to occur during the normal course of being bathed and are not 
remembered as being stressful, traumatic, or painful at the time they occurred.  Yet, events such as these are routinely ǲrememberedǳ in considerable detail and are now 
interpreted as having been traumatic at the time they occurred.    
These rather curious ǲmemoriesǳ are maintained despite the fact that 
complainants are also apparently aware of the obvious contradiction – that is, they are 
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aware of the fact that such events would not have been interpreted as traumatic at the 
time they occurred but now believe that they were traumatic.  Thus, consistent with the 
idea that autobiographical memories are later reinterpreted in terms of our current 
needs, wants, and wishes, complainants reinterpret ostensibly innocuous events in 
terms of their current beliefs that they were abused as children.  
 Of course, the immediate question that comes to an expertǯs mind is how can ȋor 
even, why would) we have a memory for what for all intents and purposes appears to be 
an innocuous event?  Moreover, why would the complainants and the triers of fact 
believe this to be a gauge of the overall accuracy and veracity of the events being 
recalled?  This is particularly worrisome because the events being reported are 
ostensibly ones that we all may have experienced but one that few if any of us would 
ever claimed to have remembered.  Indeed, if one asks triers of fact to remember their 
own early experiences of being bathed, most if not all would be hard-pressed to come up 
with such a memory!  Despite these seemingly obvious questions, such testimony is 
routinely found in cases of historic childhood sexual abuse. 
 A second curious finding in the testimony of many complainants is the inclusion 
of very specific (and ostensibly peripheral) details in events that would have been 
traumatic at the time when other, more important aspects of the events are missing.  For 
example, why would one remember specific conversations or the locations of other 
people in the house when one could not even provide an accurate description of the 
alleged perpetrator?  Although we may not be able to provide a precise guideline on 
what elements of events are truly peripheral and which ones are critical and central, at 
the very least, we would expect that some ability to describe the perpetrator should be a 
prerequisite.  Indeed, there are transcripts filled with narratives in which the 
complainant cannot remember important details of the perpetrators who have been 
allegedly abusing them over a number of years.  For example, one complainant (PF) has 
considerable problems remembering what her perpetrator looked like.  That is, when 
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she was asked how old the perpetrator was she replied: ǲabout ʹͲ or about ͳͷ or ͳ͵ … 
or 16, ) donǯt know.ǳ  When she was asked what he looked like she stated: ǲ) canǯt remember.ǳ  When asked what his hair was like she said: ǲall spiked up, or just normal, ) donǯt know.ǳ  Finally, when asked what color his hair was she responded: ǲitǯs blonde or 
black, or red brown.  Or just, or just like, just bald, without no hair.ǳ   
Of course, it is also of interest that these same complainants who can report 
what may be described as tangential information can provide no such information when 
it comes to other important experiences from the same era in their childhood (e.g., 
schools, teachers, friends, hobbies).  Indeed, some complainants report that their 
memory for their childhood is extremely poor and has been poor until they suddenly 
started remembering what they believe to be abusive events.  It is only then that memories start to ǲfloodǳ back.  For example, one complainant stated that she could now 
remember being ǲ… about one yearǯs old, ) was in the pram and my dad was trying to 
pull me out, but before my dad took me out of the pram, one of my sisters got me out of the pram.ǳ  Of course, we know that such narrative accounts of events from this early an 
early age (one year old) are not commonplace in the scientific literature.  Indeed, such 
memories are deemed by most if not all memory researchers to be impossible, occurring 
at the earliest around two to three years old (for a review, see Howe, 2011).  Even then, 
such recollections are observed only very rarely.  
To further illustrate these (as well as a number of other) points, consider HR, a 
woman who was 20 years old at the time of her complaint.  She recounts what she 
believes to be a series of sexual abuse instances from her childhood, starting around the 
age of 4 years old, including 10 counts of rape between the ages of 6 to 8 years.  She also 
claims that she never remembered any of these events until, following counseling at the 
age of 15 or 16 years, she started remembering the alleged incidents: 
 
HR:  ǲ… ) kind of forgot all about it and it suddenly came back to me.ǳ 
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What always strikes me in cases like these is why charges are ever brought in 
the first place.   These memories are relatively recent compared to cases where they 
have lain ǲdormantǳ for ͵Ͳ or ͶͲ years, and the claim that such memories were 
forgotten flies in the face of considerable scientific research showing that children and 
adults do remember their abuse, even some 12 to 20 years later (e.g., Alexander et al., 
2005).  It is clear that this message has not trickled down to those working in the 
judicial system, something that clearly needs our attention. 
 Another curious feature of this case was that when these ǲmemoriesǳ did come 
back, they included considerable details about what the alleged perpetrator said even 
during an alleged rape incident when she was 6 years old: 
 
HR:  ǲ… he told me to keep watching the TVǳ 
HR:  ǲDonǯt tell anyone ) did it, nobody would believe you.  )tǯs our little secret.ǳ 
HR:  ǲAnd you donǯt want your mum to call you a liar and things.ǳ 
 
HR also provides considerable detail in her police statement about the different rape 
events.  For example, when describing an alleged rape incident from the age of 6 years, 
she is asked: 
 ǲPolice Officer ȋPOȌ: So, would he be on your right or left side? (R: (eǯd be on my left. 
PO: Okay, can you remember what the sofa was like? (R: Erm, ) think it was only a small, red, if ) can remember rightly … ) think it was, no,  
 sorry, it was a grey sofa, like a small grey sofa, like a three seater but a small one. PO: Okay. Dǯyou know what time of day it was? 
HR: Erm, )ǯd say it was around teatime. 
PO: Okay. And there was nobody else in the flat. 
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HR: No. 
PO: So he took your pants off. What did he do then? 
HR: He put them on the floor. 
PO: Okay. 
HR: And laid me down, cos I was sat up.  Erm, so he laid me down on the sofa. 
PO: Were you wearing underwear? 
HR: Yeah, so he took off my pants and my underwear and put them on the floor and lay  
 me, he laid me down on the sofa. 
PO: Okay. Were you wearing clothing on your top half? 
HR: Yeah. 
PO: What happened to that? (R: That stayed on.ǳ 
 
HR also claims to remember that the defendant ejaculated inside her and that no 
contraception was used during this (or any other) alleged rape experience(s).  These are 
things that most 6-year-olds would probably know very little about.  Indeed, this 
detailed description stands in juxtaposition to her inability to remember other 
important events during that same time period (e.g., what school she attended, teachers, 
friends).  As well, much of what is being ǲrememberedǳ could simply be schematic 
information from autobiographical memory (e.g., that she always wore underwear, that 
there was a grey sofa when she was a child) and does not necessarily represent a 
specific episodic experience.  Again, these sorts of claims (e.g., remembering conversations verbatim, having more mature knowledge than oneǯs age would suggestȌ, 
are also inconsistent with the literature on memory and memory development and 
should have served as a red flag for those in the judiciary to proceed with caution when assessing the veracity of (Rǯs allegations. 
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 Of course, there are other cautionary signs in this case.  These include the type of 
counseling HR received before suddenly having ǲflashbacksǳ of these alleged rape 
incidents, how the number of events and details within events grew over time and 
counseling sessions, as well as conversations she had with close friends concerning their 
sexual abuse experiences.  For example, before (R ǲrememberedǳ any of these alleged 
experiences, she reports that she was, 
 
HR:  ǲ… told that itǯs [sexual abuse] happened to a couple of girls that ) used to know  
 when we were children … and theyǯre the ones that told me about it happening  
 to them … and they believed it happened to me too … so ) said, ǮYeah.ǯǳ 
 
Although not always diagnostic by themselves, when taken together, all of these 
signs should have raised a very large red flag.  This is something that needs to be 
communicated more generally in the public domain as well as specifically to people who 
work in the judicial system.  Indeed, this is an excellent example of a case where the 
memory expert should have been called in before charges were laid, something that in 
all likelihood would have avoided the filing of charges and a lengthy trial and would 
have saved the taxpayer considerable expense.   In fact, the outcome of this case, one 
that is relatively unique in my 20 years of experience, was one where both memory 
experts (the defence and prosecution) agreed that: 
 ǲ… (Rǯs memories of sexual abuse could be false … [indeed] the elements described here concerning (Rǯs memory give us cause for concern and we urge the court to exercise appropriate caution about the possibilities of false memories.ǳ 
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Quite rightly, the judge in this case instructed the jurors to find the defendant not guilty 
on all 10 counts, an outcome that is perhaps an important call to have memory expertise 
earlier in the judicial process. 
Other cases exhibit very similar properties.  For example, WM had no memory 
for her traumatic experiences until she received religious counseling and ǲprayerǳ therapy: ǲ … itǯs all coming back now, cos itǯs usually, for a long time ) dinǯt remember it until last year.ǳ  )n addition, when specifically queried as to how her memories suddenly 
came back, WM reveals the following: 
 ǲPO: So, what was it that triggered it, what … how did it come back into your memory? WM: We were praying … )t was, it was two years ago, prayer week, so it mustǯve been  
 about May/June two years ago. 
PO: Right. WM: … thatǯs when it all started coming back bit by bit.  ) mean, itǯs coming back now, itǯs  
 come back, some of the bits have come back as )ǯve been talking to you.ǳ 
 
Here, we have an instance of alleged memories that not only emerge as a consequence of 
intense memory work (ostensibly through concentration during prayer), but ones that 
continue to emerge during an interview with a police officer some one to two years 
later!  Worse, for WM these ǲmemoriesǳ not only returned during sessions of intense 
prayer, but also in nightmares.  Of course, the scientific literature suggests that dreams 
and some forms of counseling can lead one to believe that events experienced during 
these times of altered consciousness are in fact real (e.g., see Loftus & Davis, 2006; 
McNally, 2003). 
 Both of these cases are from complainants whose experiences allegedly 
transpired relatively recently (both were around the 20-years old when they lodged 
their complaints).  Interestingly, more historic cases exhibit many similarities.  For 
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example, KC, a woman in her mid 40s, filed a series of complaints about events that had 
happened some 38 to 40 years earlier following a period of intense counseling for sexual 
problems.  Although there were no notes available from these counseling sessions (a 
phenomenon that afflicts many of these cases), it was clear that the focus of these 
sessions was on her sexual history: 
 ǲPO: (owǯs it come about that youǯve decided now to come to the police? KC: … ) went for some counseling, sexual counseling because ) have some issues … which  
 impacts on my sexual life. ǲ 
 
Moreover, because of what has been discussed in counseling, KC is experiencing 
additional problems: 
 ǲPO: And have you ever had flashbacks or nightmares or anything? KC: ) do get them. ) do especially if thereǯs been something on the television about abuse  
 or you read something in the paper.ǳ 
 
Here, like in so many other cases, the complainant has had some ǲhelpǳ in terms of getting her ǲmemoriesǳ to return as well as in ǲrecoveringǳ specific details.  This help is 
not just in the form of counseling she received, but many of the details KC reported were 
similar to details found in the popular media, something which she stated influenced her 
recollection of her own alleged abuse.  Here again, the possibility of memory 
contamination due to suggestion (among other things) led the judge to instruct the jury 
to find the defendant not guilty on all 13 charges.  This case provides another instance 
where memory expertise, if requested early in the judicial process, might have avoided 
the necessity of a trial. 
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III.  Memory Lessons Learned on the Witness Stand 
So, having become an accidental expert witness testifying about memory, what have I 
learned from this experience?  Although as noted, I have learned a considerable amount about peopleǯs naïve beliefs about memory in general, perhaps more importantly, ) have 
discovered what people believe about their memories of early childhood.  For example, 
people believe that childhood memories, or certainly those memories for what might 
later be construed as stressful and traumatic events, can be very accurate, not only for 
central details (what happened), but also for seemingly peripheral or tangential 
information (what people were wearing and exact conversations).  Although such beliefs 
are rather commonplace when gauging the accuracy of eyewitness testimony more 
generally, the litmus test for believability of early memories is linked to the amount of 
detail provided by the person doing the remembering.  This belief persists despite the 
fact that all of the research concerning our early memories demonstrates the paucity of 
such detail (e.g., see Howe, 2011, 2012).   
 So given this 20 or so years of experience as an expert witness, what do I think 
needs to be done?  For me, the key take-home message is we, as memory experts, need 
to do a better job of translating our research into knowledge that can be more accessible 
to triers of fact, police interviewers, and the public more generally.  I have always 
viewed the role of the memory expert in legal circles as one that should come to a rapid 
and early extinction.  By this I mean that the facts or ǲlawsǳ that are discovered by 
memory researchers needs to become part of nonspecialistsǯ knowledge base or a ǲculture of memory.ǳ  It is only then that the admonition of some judges and lawyers will 
be correct inasmuch as the memory expert will have no additional expertise above and 
beyond the expertise of the well-informed layperson.  Once our expertise becomes part 
of everyoneǯs knowledge base, memory experts will not have additional information 
that triers of fact need to know. 
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 Of course, this is somewhat naïve as memory research marches on and new 
discoveries will undoubtedly be made, one that will be pertinent to legal cases in which 
memory serves as (the only) evidence.  Because the reality of the situation is such that 
the need for memory expertise will not become extinct (or even endangered), my 
submission is that memory experts need to be involved as early in the process as 
possible, preferably before charges are laid.  Indeed, when memory is an issue in a case, 
such evidence should be vetted by those with expertise in the science of memory along 
with other forensic specialists.  Such a recommendation, if followed, should reduce the 
overall costs associated with such legal proceedings if for no other reason than this 
advice should reduce the number of historic child sex abuse cases that go to trial. 
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